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Abstract
The so called quantum game theory has recently been proclaimed as one of the new
branches in the development of both quantum information theory and game theory. However,
the notion of a quantum game itself has never been strictly defined, which has led to a lot of
conceptual confusion among different authors. In this paper we introduce a new conceptual
framework of a scenario and an implementation of a game. It is shown that the procedures
of “quantization” of games proposed in the literature lead in fact to several different games
which can be defined within the same scenario, but apart from this they may have nothing in
common with the original game. Within the framework we put forward, a lot of conceptual
misunderstandings that have arisen around “quantum games” can be stated clearly and
resolved uniquely. In particular, the proclaimed essential role of entanglement in several
static “quantum games”, and their connection with Bell inequalities, is disproved.
1 Introduction
Since the late 1990’s, numerous works on so-called “quantum games” have appeared (e.g. [1, 2,
3, 4, 5, 6, 7]), resulting sometimes in a redefinition of basic notions of a game-theoretic nature,
not always in a precise way. The goal of this note is to clarify the terminology and concepts
used by different authors.
The abstract concept of a static game is defined through a set of players, the set of their
strategies, and a set of payoff functions (cf. e.g. [8] for a formal introduction to the topic).
This notion is sufficient for most considerations of a game-theoretical nature, e.g. finding Nash
equilibria. However, the very idea of a game presupposes the existence of real-world situations
in which players undertake various actions in accordance with their chosen strategies, and they
obtain payoffs according to the achieved final state of a game. Any such real-world situation
can be called implementation of a game. In particular, an implementation of a game can be
understood as a physical system where strategies are represented by some transformations on
the system, and payoffs are represented by results of appropriate measurement performed on the
system. Obviously, one abstract game may have many different implementations, which does
not affect the essential properties of the game.
Throughout this note, we introduce and use the concept of an n×k scenario, which intuitively
may be understood as a framework of inputs/outputs, rather like a computer science problem
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(cf. [9]). The notion of a scenario in the context of game theory is a new concept, and is defined
with the aim of clarifying the way in which the quantum framework is introduced into game
theory. Scenarios are given as triples (X ,Y, $), where X ,Y ⊆ {0, . . . , k − 1}n are valid inputs
and outputs for the scenario, respectively, while $ = ($1, . . . , $n), where each $i : X ×Y → R, is
an evaluating function. Some examples of n× 2 scenarios are based on well-known problems in
game theory and distributed computing, including:
• The minority scenario, which takes no input (X = ∅), allows single-bit output for each
player (Y = {0, 1}n), and for a bit vector (y1, y2, . . . , yn) ∈ Y we have $(y1, y2, . . . , yn) =
(c1, c2, . . . , cn), where ci = 1 if |{yj : yi = yj , 1 ≤ j ≤ n}| < n/2, where |A| denotes
cardinality of a set A, and ci = 0 otherwise.
• The Prisoner’s Dilemma scenario for n = 2, which takes no input (X = ∅), allows single-
bit output for each player (Y = {0, 1}2), and an evaluating function such that $1(1, 0) =
$2(0, 1) > $1(0, 0) = $2(0, 0) > $1(1, 1) = $2(1, 1) > $1(0, 1) = $2(1, 0), and $1(0, 0) ≥
($1(1, 0) + $1(0, 1)) /2.
• The Battle of the Sexes scenario, which is similar to that of the Prisoner’s Dilemma, except
for different evaluating functions: $1(0, 0) = $2(1, 1) > $1(1, 1) = $2(0, 0) > $1(0, 1) =
$2(0, 1) = $1(1, 0) = $2(1, 0).
• The modulo-4 scenario [10] for n = 3, where input X = {(x1, x2, x3) : x1, x2, x3 ∈
{0, 1} and x1 + x2 + x3 ≡ 0 mod 2}, output Y = {0, 1}3, and $(y1, y2, y3) = (1, 1, 1)
if 2(y1 + y2 + y3) ≡ x1 + x2 + x3 mod 4, and $(y1, y2, y3) = (0, 0, 0), otherwise.
All of these scenarios are inspired by some n×2 games∗, but in the context of this discussion and
prior works, may in fact lead to games different from the original ones. The first three games
(Minority Game, Prisoner’s Dilemma and The Battle of the Sexes) are well known and do not
require additional comments. The modulo-4 game is a sequential game. In the first stage, one
player gives one bit to each of his three opponents, in such a way that the sum of distributed
bits equals 0 or 2. In the second stage, each of the opponents produces bit output, and no
communication between the players is allowed. If the doubled sum of the outputs is congruent
to the sum of inputs modulo 4, the first player gives payoff 0, whereas his opponents receive 1.
Otherwise, the payoff of the first player is 1, whereas his opponents receive 0.
Within a single scenario, we can define different procedures for transforming input into
output. This sort of procedure is a general concept and need not be described by any computable
function. Here, we confine ourselves to the so called EWL-type procedure, inspired by the original
model of Eisert, Wilkens and Lewenstein (EWL) [1]. Although only n × 2 scenarios can be
furnished with the EWL-type procedure, this notion is sufficient for discussing most cases which
appear in the literature concerning “quantum” versions of games.
The EWL-type procedure is parameterized by the five-tuple P = (n,H, J, ρ,U), where n is
the number of players, H,J are unitary operators on (C2)⊗n, ρ is some initial n-qubit state,
and U is a compact subset of SU(2)†. The procedure works as follows: the initial n-qubit
state ρ undergoes evolution under the successive actions of operator J , of some operator U =
U1,x1 ⊗ · · · ⊗Un,xn , where Ui,xi ∈ U are operators (encoding action of i-th player) dependent on
input X = (x1, . . . , xn) ∈ X , and finally of operator H. The final state ρf is measured in the
standard basis, and the measurement result Y ∈ {0, 1} is treated as the output of the system.
∗That is games with n players, each equipped with two pure strategies.
†
SU denotes the special unitary group.
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Formally, the probability p(Y |X) of obtaining output Y ∈ Y for input X under procedure P is
given as follows:
p(Y |X) ≡ Pr[Y = (y1, . . . , yn) | U1,x1 , . . . , Un,xn ] = Tr(Qy1 ⊗ · · · ⊗Qynρf ) (1)
where:
ρf = HUJρ(HUJ)†,
Q0 = |0〉〈0| and Q1 = |1〉〈1|,
U = U1,x1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ Un,xn .
The most important property of the described EWL-type procedure is formulated in the following
proposition.
Proposition 1. Assume that some n×2 scenario with no input, F = (∅,Y, $), is furnished with
some EWL-type procedure P , where the actions of the players are defined through their choices
of local unitary operators U1, . . . , Un. Then procedure P within scenario F is an implementation
of some static (possibly continuous) n-player game, which has at least one Nash equilibrium.
Proof. Indeed, procedure P implements a game which has n players, a set of pure strategies
corresponding to some parametrization (θ, ϕ, χ) of elements of U ⊆ SU(2), and a payoff function
U = (U1, . . . ,Un), given for player i as:
Ui((θ1, ϕ1, χ1), . . . , (θn, ϕn, χn)) =
∑
y1,...,yn∈{0,1}
$i(y1, . . . , yn)Tr(Qy1 ⊗ · · · ⊗Qynρf ). (2)
In the case of discrete sets U every such game as n-player game with a finite set of strategies ad-
mits Nash equilibrium (at least in mixed strategies) according to Nash Theorem [11]. In the case
of continuous sets U defined game as a continuous game with compact set of strategies and con-
tinuous payoff functions, admits a Nash equilibrium (at least in mixed strategies corresponding
to probability measures on the set of strategies) according to Glicksberg’s Theorem [12].
In the case of a general n × k scenario (that is a scenario motivated by some n-player
game, where each player has k pure strategies), the above defined EWL-type procedure can
be straightforwardly generalized, using states and operators on k-dimensional Hilbert space,
instead of 2-dimensional Hilbert space of qubits. Then, a similar proposition can be formulated.
We do not formulate this general version of the proposition for the sake of clarity of further
considerations.
2 How much quantumness is there in static quantum games?
2.1 Two-player “quantum games”
In some comments [13, 3, 14], it is pointed out that by redefining a classical implementation of
certain games in a quantum setting, one obtains an implementation of a different game, having
a wider set of strategies. This discussion may be more precisely restated within the introduced
framework, using the notions of a game, an implementation, and a scenario. Indeed, each of the
scenarios defined in the Introduction (the minority scenario, the Prisoner’s Dilemma scenario,
etc.) can be furnished with a class of procedures, some of which constitute implementations of
different games, with the original game being the motivation for defining a given scenario. For
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example, within the Battle of the Sexes scenario we can define several EWL-type procedures,
corresponding to the implementation of the standard Battle of the Sexes game and to some
different versions of the “quantum Battle of the Sexes game” (cf. [15, 1, 16, 17, 18]):
• P1 = (n = 2, J = 1 ,H = 1 , ρ = |00〉〈00|,U = {σx, 1 })
• P2 = (n = 2, J = 1 ,H = 1 , ρ = 12(|00〉〈00| + |00〉〈11| + |11〉〈00| + |11〉〈11|),U = {σx, 1 })
• P3 = (n = 2, J = 1 ,H = 1 , ρ = 12
(
1 − (ǫ1 + ǫ2)
)(|00〉〈00| + |11〉〈11|) + ǫ1|01〉〈01| +
ǫ2|10〉〈10|,U = {σx, 1 }), where |ǫ1 − ǫ2| > 0
• P4 = (n = 2, J = eiγσy⊗σy ,H = J†, ρ = |00〉〈00|,U = {U(θ, φ)} ⊂ SU(2))
• P5 = (n = 2, J = eiγσy⊗σy ,H = J†, ρ = |00〉〈00|,U = {U(θ, φ, χ)} = SU(2))
P1 is obviously an implementation of the standard Battle of the Sexes game, while P2, P3, P4 and
P5 are implementations of the so called “quantum Battle of the Sexes” game in the versions from
[18], [17], [1], and [15] respectively. P1, P2 and P3 are implementations of three different discrete
games, which have identical sets of strategies, but different payoff functions, while P4 and P5
are implementations of two different continuous games, which have different sets of strategies,
different payoff functions and different Nash equilibria [16]. Consequently, games implemented
by P2, P3, P4 and P5 have nothing in common with the standard Battle of the Sexes game except
for the fact that all these four games can be introduced within the same scenario, motivated by
the standard Battle of the Sexes game.
Exactly the same conclusions are reached when considering “quantum versions” of other
static games with n players equipped with two strategies (e.g. the “quantum Prisoner’s Dilemma”
studied in [1]). In each case the “quantization” of a game is just defining a different (usually
continuous) game within a scenario motivated by the original game. The only common element
of the original and modified games is the same number of players, and the fact that the pay-
off functions from the original game enter Eq. (2) for the payoff functions of the “quantized”
version.
Although we have only discussed “quantization” of games with two strategies for each player,
analogous reasoning can be performed for more general situation using n×k scenarios furnished
with appropriate procedures, leading to similar conclusions.
2.2 When does entanglement help?
Several papers [4, 5, 2] have considered quantum versions of minority games in which an en-
tangled state, initially shared by all parties, and finally measured in some basis, leads to new
Nash equilibria, increasing the payoff of all players with respect to the classical versions.‡ Using
the framework introduced herein we can easily show that within the minority scenario (or in
fact, more generally, all scenarios with empty input), this type of effect can always be achieved
without resorting to entanglement, using purely classical resources.
Indeed, consider three different EWL-type procedures within the 4-player minority scenario:
• P1 = (n = 4, J = 1 ,H = 1 , ρ = |0000〉〈0000|,U = {σx, 1 })
‡For such Nash equilibria to appear, some authors [5] assume that the strategies used by all players are
identical. This assumption is logically flawed in a game-theoretic context. However, for an appropriately chosen
initial state, new Nash equilibria appear regardless of this assumption.
4
• P2 = (n = 4, J = 1 ,H = 1 , ρin,U = {σx, 1 }), where
ρin =
1
8
(Q0⊗Q0⊗Q0⊗Q1 +Q0⊗Q0⊗Q1⊗Q0 +Q0⊗Q1⊗Q0⊗Q0 +Q1⊗Q0⊗Q0⊗Q0+
+Q1⊗Q1⊗Q1⊗Q0 +Q1⊗Q1⊗Q0⊗Q1 +Q1⊗Q0⊗Q1⊗Q1 +Q0⊗Q1⊗Q1⊗Q1)
• P3 = (n = 4, J = 1 ,H = 1 , ̺in = |ψin〉〈ψin|,U = {U(θ, φ, χ)} = SU(2)), where:
|ψin〉 = α√
2
(|0000〉 + |1111〉) +
√
1− α2
2
(|01〉 + |10〉)⊗2
Here, P1 corresponds to the classical minority game, P3 is the “quantum minority game” from [5],
and P2 is some procedure in which the initial state ρin is separable and no entanglement ever
appears (since J = H = 1 ).
Within the 4-player minority scenario, let p(Y ) be the probability of obtaining output Y =
(y1, y2, y3, y4), yi ∈ {0, 1}, as given by Eq. (1) of Section 1. Then, there exists a mixed separable
state ρ =
∑
Y ∈{0,1}4 [p(Y )(Qy1 ⊗Qy2 ⊗Qy3 ⊗Qy4)], such that the trivial strategy Ui = 1 results
in the same output distribution {(Y, p(Y ))}. Thus, in particular, the considered procedure P2
includes a Pareto-optimal Nash equilibrium, corresponding to p(Y ) = 1/8 for bit-outputs Y
which have an odd number of ones, and p(Y ) = 0 otherwise. This strategy leads to exactly the
same payoff of 1/4 as an analogous strategy which appears when considering procedure P3 [5].
In this sense, the difference between the two games implemented by procedures P1 and P3 is
the same as in the case of procedures P1 and P2, and so no quantum entanglement is required
to achieve such a distinction.
We remark that in the procedure P2, the separable state ρin may be considered in a purely
classical setting as follows. Initially, a helper randomly picks one of two decks of 4 cards each,
one with numbers {0, 0, 0, 1} written on the hidden faces, and the other with numbers {1, 1, 1, 0}.
Then, the helper shuffles the cards and randomly gives them out to the 4 players of the game.
At this point, the only Pareto-optimal strategy for each player is to read out the value of the
card received, achieving an expected payoff of 1/4 for each player.
Whereas the considered effect never requires entanglement for scenarios with no input, en-
tanglement may sometimes be beneficial in the case of scenarios with non-trivial input. This
is the case, for example, for the modulo-4 scenario. The analysis follows from that used in
the discussion of quantum distributed computing models [19]. In order to introduce the con-
cept of an implementation of a game for scenarios with non-trivial input we have to refor-
mulate conclusions from the Proposition 1. Let P be some EWL-type procedure for some
n × 2 scenario F = (X ,Y, $), where elements X ∈ X and Y ∈ Y are given by vectors
X = (x1, . . . , xn), Y = (y1, . . . , yn). The implementation of a game is then understood in terms
of repeated iterations of the game process, where all inputs are chosen with equal probability,
and payoffs are averaged over the statistical sample. Formally, procedure P implements a game
which has n players, a set of pure strategies for i-th player corresponding to some parametriza-
tion {(θ0, ϕ0, χ0), (θ1, ϕ1, χ1)} of two elements {Ui,0, Ui,1} of U ⊆ SU(2) (corresponding to two
different values of possible input xi for i-th player), and a payoff function U = (U1, . . . ,Un),
given for player i as:
Ui =
1
|X |
∑
x1,...,xn∈{0,1}
∑
y1,...,yn∈{0,1}
$i(x1, . . . , xn, y1, . . . , yn)Tr(Qy1 ⊗ · · · ⊗Qynρf (x1, . . . , xn)).
(3)
Let us define the following EWL-type procedure within the modulo-4 scenario:
PGHZ = (n = 3, J = 1 ,H = 1 , ρ = |GHZ〉〈GHZ|,U = SU(2)) (4)
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where |GHZ〉 = 1√
2
(|000〉 + |111〉). According to former considerations, this procedure is an
implementation of a 3-player continuous game. The important fact is that this game has strategy
profiles, which maximize payoffs for all players in the sense of Eq. (3). It can be proven, that
this situation within modulo-4 scenario cannot be achieved by implementations using separable
states only [19].
To sum up, the reason why entanglement is essential for the modulo-4 scenario is that among
all games that can be implemented by procedures within this scenario, only those using entangled
states in implementations have strategy profiles which lead to maximal possible payoff for each
player. Nevertheless, all those games are still different static games, and all considerations of
the beneficence of entanglement can be reasonably performed at the level of scenarios, and not
of the games themselves. It should be emphasized that the requirement of entanglement in such
cases is a consequence of the specific definition of the scenario, and does not imply any essential
quantumness of the underlying games themselves.
2.3 Notation in quantum games vs. Bell-type inequalities
Some authors have recently remarked on the apparent similarities between non-cooperative
quantum minority games and Bell inequalities [5]. In view of the previous sections, effects
related to entanglement are not observed in the minority scenario, hence such a similarity must
be illusory. We elaborate this point below.
Since game theory is based on probabilistic framework (in the sense of Kolmogorovian prob-
ability theory), the discussion of any possible relation to Bell-type inequalities should treat
them in purely probabilistic terms, not referring to philosophical assumptions behind them [10].
Bell-type inequalities introduce bounds on values of correlation functions of random variables in
Kolmogorovian probability theory. From the theorem of Gelfand and Naimark [20] we conclude
that if the set of observables of a system can be represented as Abelian algebra, then all the
observables from this algebra may be treated as random variables on some common probability
space. However, Quantum Mechanics introduces non-Abelian algebras of observables, which
cannot be represented as random variables on a common probability space, consequently lead-
ing to the violation of Bell-type inequalities. From this point of view we can say that Quantum
Mechanics is a generalization of classical probability. Each compatible set of observables can
be individually treated classically (as random variables), but the whole algebra of observables
obviously cannot. This fact leads to the concept of contextuality : each measurement context
(that is the choice of compatible observables) defines a different classical statistical model.
After this short introduction the improper manner of applying Bell-type inequalities to given
experimental situation in “quantum minority game” from [5] (defined by procedure P3 in sec-
tion 2.2) is clearly revealed. Bell-type inequalities involve correlations of measurement results
on different observables chosen independently by each observer, and this framework is the only
reasonable one within which we can discuss correlations of independent local measurements. If
violation of Bell-type inequalities is achieved, then this implies that the Bell-type inequality
involves mean values of random variables (assigned to quantum observables) coming from dif-
ferent, incompatible classical probabilistic models (different experimental contexts induced by
independent choices of measurement settings applied by each observer).
However, the expression for the payoff function in [5] is based on the relative frequencies of
measurement outcomes (i.e., different real eigenvalues) in measurements of a single global ob-
servable, which of course does not fit into the discussed scheme of applying Bell-type inequalities
to an experimental situation. One may argue that local unitary operations performed by each
of the players define a measurement basis for the final measurement, hence approaching the
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correlational scheme of Bell-type inequalities. This argument is not valid in this discussion: ac-
cording to the rules imposed on players in [5], the performed unitary operations are identical for
each player, thus they define only one experimental context (i.e., the same local measurements).
When there is only one experimental context, no Bell-type inequalities can be violated. Hence,
the violation of Bell-type inequality in the experimental situation presented in the “quantum
minority game” from [5] is of no meaning.
The misunderstanding arises because of the combinatorial similarity between the expression
for the payoff function and MABK Bell polynomial ([21, 22, 23]). However, if the payoff function
reveals any similarity to the MABK Bell polynomial, the only reasonable experimental situation
to which it would refer is a setup with 4 observers, each measuring two different observables. But
this is not the situation in “quantum minority game”. There is no similarity in any other sense
that combinatorial between the MABK polynomial and the payoff function. We can generalize
this to the obvious statement that whenever any function referring to a physical quantity is
similar in form to expressions forming Bell-type inequalities, it does not mean that we can
reasonably discuss for this quantity the violation of the Bell-type inequality, which is applicable
to only one experimental situation.
3 Conclusions
The formalization of quantum procedures in static games, which we propose herein, reveals two
natural paths of future research. On the one hand, it is interesting to study scenarios with non-
trivial input, which may potentially reveal genuinely quantum effects. Such effects, including
any possible relations to Bell inequalities, can never be observed for scenarios with zero input.
On the other hand, one may potentially attempt to introduce the concept of a quantum game,
which relies on a quantization of the underlying mathematical formalism of a game, rather than
modifications to scenarios.
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